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DIVERSITY AND NEIGHBOURHOOD SATISFACTION*
Monica Langella and Alan Manning
This article investigates the impact of ethnic diversity on individuals’ satisfaction with their neighbourhoods.
It uses panel data and a variety of empirical methods to control for potential endogeneity of diversity and
of location choices. We find that a higher white share raises overall satisfaction with the neighbourhood in
our (overwhelming white) sample, but has no significant impact on generalised trust or other commonly
used measures of social capital. We suggest that part of the impact of diversity on overall neighbourhood
satisfaction may be through an effect on fear of crime, though we find no effect on actual crime.
Sizeable parts of the population of most Western countries seem troubled by increased ethnic
diversity in their societies. For many people, the most direct impact of these changes is felt in
their communities. This article is about how ethnic diversity within neighbourhoods in the UK
affects people’s satisfaction with their local areas.
We consider a wider range of outcomes than most of the existing literature: overall satisfaction
with the neighbourhood, trust in others, activity in organisations (these two being commonly
used measures of ‘social capital’, e.g., Putnam, 2000), the intention to move, actual residential
mobility, perceptions of and actual crime, and the quality of social life and of local services.
In doing so, we aim to provide a more complete description of the impact of diversity on
communities. The main findings of our article are that a lower white share leads to lower levels
of neighbourhood satisfaction in our (overwhelmingly white) sample and increased perceptions
of crime (though crime itself seems unrelated). But diversity is not strongly associated with the
level of generalised trust, activity in organisations, the quality of social life or the quality of local
services. The lack of correlation with many of these variables is perhaps as interesting as the
significant results. This article contributes to two sizeable strands of research on the impact of
diversity at local level: studies of the link between social capital and diversity, and studies on the
impact of diversity on neighbourhood choices and residential mobility.
A number of existing studies find that greater diversity reduces trust (Putnam, 2007; Dinesen
and Sønderskov, 2012), lowers involvement in organisations (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2002;
Costa and Kahn, 2003), lowers the level of social cohesion (see the survey by Van der Meer and
Tolsma, 2014), lowers the level of public good provision (Alesina et al., 1999; the review by
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), lowers the quality of government (Alesina and Zhuravskhaya,
2011) or changes attitudes to redistribution (Dahlberg et al., 2012).
The studies cited above have been controversial and subject to a number of criticisms (see
Portes and Vickstrom, 2011, for an overview). First, confounding factors—at both individual and
neighbourhood levels—may play a role in explaining the correlation between diversity and trust.
One example of this can be poverty, as shown by the Moving To Opportunity (MTO) evaluations
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(Kling et al., 2007, Ludwig et al., 2012, and Chetty et al., 2016), which have found important
effects of neighbourhood poverty on subjective well-being, mental health and long-term child
outcomes. In addition, Uslaner (2012) argues that it is segregation rather than diversity that is
important, while Tesei (2015) points to the importance of racial income inequality.
There are also concerns that most studies in this area rely on correlations in cross-sectional data
in which causal evidence is limited (Portes and Vickstrom, 2011).1 One contribution of this article
is to pay greater attention to causality using three different approaches. First, we use individual-
level longitudinal data to document the effect of diversity on neighbourhood perceptions. This
allows us to control for individual and neighbourhood fixed effects. Second, we develop an
empirical approach to control for the possible selection bias caused by the endogeneity of
residential choice. Third, we instrument for diversity using an instrument popularised by Altonji
and Card (1991) and Card (2001), which uses predicted ethnic mix based on neighbourhood-
specific initial ethnic mix and national growth rates in the population of different ethnic minorities.
We hope that, in addressing these empirical issues, we will make some progress in providing
causal estimates of the impact of diversity. Throughout, we report a wide variety of specifications
(including some very demanding ones) in order to convey the robustness (or lack of it) of our
empirical findings.
One other relevant literature is that on how ethnic composition affects neighbourhood choice.
In the United States the most striking evidence for this is ‘white flight’, the process by which
some US neighbourhoods and cities rapidly became majority black (Card et al., 2008; Boustan,
2010, 2012, for the United States and Kaufmann and Harris, 2015, for the UK) but other studies
have also estimated preferences for racial composition (e.g., Bayer et al., 2007). Studies of
residential mobility reveal the preferences of the marginal residents of a neighbourhood but,
without further assumptions, find it harder to make more general statements about the impact of
diversity on preferences. In contrast, our variable on neighbourhood satisfaction is informative
about the preferences of infra-marginal residents, which may be the most important impact,
especially in countries like the UK where residential mobility is quite low. To give an extreme
example, if residential mobility costs were so high that nobody ever changed neighbourhood,
studies of residential mobility would yield no information about preferences over neighbourhood
composition but our variable would be able to identify the effect.
A further area in which this article makes a contribution is its study of the UK.2 Most of
the literature on diversity studies the United States, and there is a risk that conclusions do not
generalise to other countries, e.g., because of the different history and nature of inter-ethnic
relations.3 The influential study of Putnam (2007) concludes by noting that the rise in diversity
is probably here to stay and societies need to work out how to manage its consequences—
consideration of other countries can then be helpful in deciding whether some impacts are
1 There are some exceptions that focus on the impact on diversity on slightly different outcomes. Most of these study
the MTO experiment in the United States (Kling et al., 2007, Ludwig et al., 2012, and Chetty et al., 2016) and exploit the
random provision of housing vouchers to encourage low-income families to move to lower-poverty neighbourhoods. An
example applied to a different context is Algan et al., 2016. They exploit the random assignment of tenants to apartment
blocks in France to investigate the impact of ethnic diversity on social relationships and housing quality.
2 The existing studies of the UK (Laurence and Heath, 2008; Letki, 2008; Andrews, 2009; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010;
Twigg et al., 2010; Laurence, 2011; Becares et al., 2011; Sturgis et al., 2011; Demireva and Heath, 2014) have focused
on the link between diversity and trust with the main focus being whether neighbourhood deprivation or diversity is the
most important factor.
3 For example, black–white interactions might be thought to be different in the two countries, as evidenced by the
different levels of interracial marriage. Fryer (2007) reports that in 2000 about 5% of blacks in the United States are in
an interracial marriage while for the UK in 2001, 35% of blacks are in a an interracial couple.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of the Share of White People Across Small Areas. UK and US Comparison. Panel A:
UK, 2011, Census Wards. Panel B: US, 2010, Census Tracts
Notes: Authors’ elaboration of UK Census Data (2011) and US Census Data (2010). Census Wards refer
to Census Area Statistics (CAS) Wards created for 2001 Census outputs. There are 10,072 CAS Wards in
England, Wales and Scotland, and they account for, on average, 5,000 people. Census tracts for the United
States are small, statistical divisions that account for 4,000 people on average.
inevitable or can be mediated. The UK is an interesting country in which to study the impact
of diversity, as many neighbourhoods have undergone sizeable changes in the last 25 years. The
fraction of the population that is non-white has risen from 5.3% in the 1991 census to 11.7% in
the 2011 census. However, the pattern of residential segregation is very different in the UK and
the United States, which might indicate differences in attitudes to diversity. Fig. 1 presents the
density of the white share of the population in US census tracts in 2010 and UK wards in 2011.4
The United States shows a marked bimodality, which might be taken as prima facie evidence that
people care about the ethnic composition of their neighbourhood. But the UK distribution has no
bimodality, perhaps suggesting that ethnic diversity is less salient in the UK than in the United
States.
To summarise, we think that our article makes a contribution in the following areas: by
investigating the impact of diversity on a wider range of outcomes than considered by most of the
literature, by paying more attention than most studies to confounding factors and causality, by
providing information about the impact of diversity on infra-marginal neighbourhood residents
and by providing estimates of the impact of diversity for a country other than the United States.
The plan of the article is as follows. In Section 1 we describe the individual data that we
use, and introduce the outcome measures that we study. Section 2 presents the neighbourhood
data and discusses our measures of diversity. Section 3 describes our empirical methodology
and the instrumental variables and selection controls that we use to address endogeneity of our
diversity measure and of residential choices. Section 4 reports our results for satisfaction with
the neighbourhood—we find robust evidence that a lower white share is associated with lower
neighbourhood satisfaction. Section 5 presents evidence that neighbourhood satisfaction predicts
intention to move and actual residential moves. Section 6 considers outcomes that have often been
studied in the social capital literature (trust and activity in organisations)—we find no significant,
4 Both tracts and wards have average population of about 4,000 so are broadly comparable in size.
C© 2019 Royal Economic Society.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ej/article-abstract/129/624/3219/5542193 by London School of Econom
ics user on 20 January 2020
3222 the economic journal [november
robust, relationship with diversity. Section 7 considers satisfaction with particular aspects of
the neighbourhood—perceptions of crime, and quality of local services and social life. We find
negative effects of the white share on perceptions of crime, which are not mirrored by evidence
on actual crime rates. Results on the quality of services and of social life are more mixed and
generally not significantly different from zero. Section 8 provides an account of the transmission
mechanism from neighbourhood characteristics to overall satisfaction with the neighbourhood.
These estimates cannot be thought of as causal but we argue that they can provide some suggestive
evidence on which channels may play a predominant role in explaining how diversity affects
neighbourhood satisfaction. Section 9 concludes.
1. Individual Data
This study uses data for the period 1991–2014 from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS)5
and its successor Understanding Society (UKHLS),6 two longitudinal British surveys with a
similar sample structure to the PSID in the United States, though asking a wider range of
questions on social attitudes. They follow a representative sample of households over time,
interviewing all individuals aged 16 or above.7 BHPS started in 1991 and lasted for 18 waves,
finishing in 2008. The first wave included around 10,300 individuals from 5,500 households in
Great Britain.8 UKHLS started in 2009 and is still ongoing. The first wave surveyed individuals
from approximately 40,000 households. Since 2010, UKHLS also includes the whole BHPS
panel9 that, at the time, surveyed individuals from about 8,000 households. Together, they allow
for the construction of a panel that covers more than 20 years. They include a wide variety of
detailed questions on perceptions and attitudes towards the neighbourhood where people live.
Unfortunately, not all questions appear in each year and there is no year in which all questions
that we consider appear10—this has implications for our empirical enquiry, which we discuss
below. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the variables, grouped into broad categories.
First, there a question on whether people like their present neighbourhoods: 92.6% do. This is
the main outcome variable that we study, primarily because it captures overall satisfaction with
neighbourhoods but also because it is asked more frequently than many of the other questions and
because it is where our results seem to be more robust. We also consider the fraction who plan
to stay in their current neighbourhood (69%) and their actual mobility from one year to the next
(6.7%). The next panel of Table 1 considers some measures of social capital—generalised trust,
whether active in or member of at least one organisation and whether one is willing to improve
one’s neighbourhood. The third panel of Table 1 presents measures relating to the perception
of crime—both an overall worry about being a victim of crime (47.8% of people are) and fears
5 University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research (2014). British Household Panel Survey, Waves
1–18, 1991–2009: Special Licence Access, Lower Layer Super Output Areas and Scottish Data Zones. [data collection].
3rd edition. UK Data Service. SN: 6136, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6136-2
6 Kantar Public, NatCen Social Research, University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research (2016).
Understanding Society: Waves 1–6, 2009–2015: Special Licence Access, Census 2001 Lower Layer Super Output Areas.
[data collection]. 7th edition, [original data producer(s)]. UK Data Service. SN: 6670, http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-S
N-6670-7
7 Since 1994, BHPS includes a short module for individuals aged 11–15.
8 Following the first wave sampling, new entrants in the sample are mainly represented by people reaching the
minimum age for the interview and people joining the original households. Additional samples of households from
Scotland and Wales were included in 1999, and for Northern Ireland in 2001.
9 The attrition rate for the BHPS panel between 2008 and 2010 was 20%.
10 Table B1 in the Online Appendix lists the relevant questions and the waves in which they appear.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Values and Attitude Variables in the British Household Panel
and in Understanding Society.
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation N
Satisfaction:
Like your present neighbourhood 0.926 0.262 244,223
Plan to stay in your neighbourhood 0.690 0.463 102,012
Actual mobility 0.067 0.250 428,457
Social capital:
Generally speaking, most people can be trusted 0.368 0.482 102,584
Active in at least one organisation 0.585 0.493 164,438
Member of at least one organisation 0.530 0.499 164,661
Willing to improve your neighbourhood 0.760 0.427 102,115
Crime:
Worry you’re being victim of crime 0.478 0.500 76,264
Feel unsafe walking alone at night 0.182 0.386 76,229
Likely home broken into 0.236 0.425 33,480
Likely car stolen/broken into 0.078 0.269 33,482
Likely people being attacked on the street 0.083 0.276 33,807
Likely racial insults/attacks 0.056 0.230 33,405
Likely teenagers hanging about 0.568 0.495 34,114
Likely drunks/tramps on the street 0.149 0.356 34,082
Likely graffiti on the walls 0.232 0.422 34,152
Likely vandalism 0.263 0.440 34,130
Quality of local services:
Good schools 0.699 0.459 61,387
Good medical services 0.706 0.456 73,782
Good transportation 0.500 0.500 70,804
Good shopping facilities 0.577 0.494 75,323
Good leisure facilities 0.441 0.497 71,382
Suitable for children 0.656 0.475 32,953
Social life:
Meet your neighbours often 0.772 0.419 147,400
Friends in the local neighbourhood 0.613 0.487 102,377
Can obtain advice locally 0.563 0.496 102,176
Can you borrow from people in the neighbourhood 0.440 0.496 102,039
Feel similar to people in the neighbourhood 0.605 0.489 102,149
Talk to people in your neighbourhood 0.694 0.461 102,441
Satisfied with social life 0.656 0.456 141,769
Notes: All variables are dummies constructed on affirmative replies to the corresponding questions. Table B1 in the
Online Appendix reports the waves where each variable appears.
about specific types of crime. As a summary index of fear of crime we mostly use the overall
‘worry’ question as this has the largest sample size, having been a question in more waves of the
survey. The fourth panel of Table 1 summarises responses to questions about the quality of local
services such as schools, medical, transport, shopping and leisure. The final panel of Table 1
summarises measures relating to the quality of social life, such as interactions and friendships
with neighbours. We combine measures of social capital, quality of local services, and quality of
life in separate indices that are constructed using the first principal component of each group of
variables. Principal component analysis results are reported in Table B2 of the Online Appendix.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Characteristics for the British Household
Panel and Understanding Society Sample.
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation
Age 46.42 18.46
Female 0.539 0.498
Unemployed 0.045 0.208
Retired 0.215 0.411
Full-time student 0.007 0.085
Other non-working 0.049 0.216
Married 0.532 0.499
Number of children 0.511 0.929
Non-white 0.097 0.296
Higher education 0.293 0.455
Low education 0.242 0.428
No education 0.175 0.380
Social house tenant 0.180 0.384
Private tenant 0.099 0.299
Notes: Excluded dummies for each set—working, high school education and homeowners, for labour force status,
education and house status, respectively—are not reported.
All our regressions control for year fixed effects and, although they are not the focus of interest,
we also include individual-level controls, which are summarised in Table 2. The individual-level
controls are age, education, gender, labour force status, housing tenure, marital status, number
of children and a dummy variable for being non-white (though some of these variables are
redundant in the specifications with individual fixed effects). We also control for time-varying
and time-invariant neighbourhood characteristics that we discuss in the following section.
2. Neighbourhood-Level Data
The geo-coded versions of the BHPS and UKHLS also contain detailed information on the
residence of the respondents in each wave, specifically the Lower Super Output Area (LSOA)
level11 that will be our main geographical reference.12 There are 40,880 LSOAs in Britain,13
containing on average 1,395 people.14 The sample size of BHPS/UKHLS is too small to be
able to compute reliable neighbourhood characteristics at this spatial scale so we use other data
sources to measure them, mostly the decennial censuses, 1991–2011 inclusive.
2.1. Measuring Diversity
The main variable of interest in our study is ethnic diversity. The number of ethnic groups
categorised varies across censuses and in our analysis we use nine groups that can be defined
11 LSOAs were created from the 2001 population census to improve the reporting of small area statistics; they were
then revised according to the 2011 census. Both BHPS and UKHLS contain information at the 2001 LSOA level. In
2001, LSOAs in England and Wales were constructed to have a minimum of 1,000 inhabitants and 400 households, and
a maximum of 3,000 inhabitants and 1,200 households. Scotland designed statistical areas following the same criteria.
Where other area codes were available, information was harmonised using Postcodes Directories (EDINA, University of
Edinburgh) and Postcode Headcounts (Office for National Statistics).
12 In all text, ’neighbourhood’ means Lower Super Output Area.
13 32,476 of which are in England, 6,502 in Scotland and 1,896 in Wales. Northern Ireland is excluded from this
analysis.
14 This datum refers to the 2001 Census of Population reference year for the LSOA areas used in this article.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Area-Level Characteristics.
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation Min Max
Britain: all areas (census years only)
White share 0.919 0.143 0.007 1
Ethnic fractionalisation index 0.127 0.181 0 0.869
Ethnic fractionalisation index (non-whites only) 0.647 0.200 0 0.880
Immigrant fractionalisation index 0.145 0.140 0 0.681
Black share 0.021 0.052 0 0.637
Asian share 0.046 0.099 0 0.987
Muslim share 0.017 0.060 0 0.938
Immigrant share 0.088 0.107 0 0.939
Immigrant share from EU 0.027 0.029 0 0.378
Immigrant share from rest of the world 0.061 0.086 0 0.911
Unemployment rate 0.037 0.034 0 0.990
Area (Ha) 564 2,720 0.73 115,963
Country of birth mix in 1971 (area level) 0.097 0.098 0 0.641
House owners 0.669 0.198 0 1
Urban areas in 1991 0.110 0.312 0 1
Britain: BHPS and UKHLS sample
White share 0.900 0.175 0 1
Ethnic fractionalisation index 0.146 0.203 0 0.872
Ethnic fractionalisation index (non-whites only) 0.666 0.166 0 0.877
Immigrant fractionalisation index 0.156 0.149 0 0.683
Black share 0.022 0.055 0 1
Asian share 0.057 0.125 0 0.962
Muslim share 0.025 0.084 0 0.952
Immigrant share 0.097 0.118 0 0.757
Immigrant share from EU 0.030 0.031 0 0.422
Immigrant share from rest of the world 0.067 0.095 0 0.757
Unemployment rate 0.037 0.029 0 0.589
Area (Ha) 599 2,152 1.24 77,870
Country of birth mix in 1971 (area level) 0.092 0.093 0 0.641
House owners 0.672 0.193 0.008 1
Urban areas in 1991 0.106 0.308 0 1
Notes: Area-level information refers to the Lower Super Output Area codification related to the 2001 census. Britain
overall panel displays descriptive statistics for all English, Welsh and Scottish LSOAs for the census years only. BHPS
and UKHLS sample panel displays results for the subset of LSOAs that appears in the British Household Panel and in
Understanding Society. Please refer to Online Appendix A for a description of the variables included.
on a consistent basis: White, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Black Caribbean, Black
African, other Asian, other Black, and a residual category grouping together all other ethnicities.
We use information from 1991 to construct an instrumental variable for the ethnic mix, as
explained in the following section.15
We impute values for the inter-censual years using linear interpolation for each area. The use
of interpolation for inter-censual years will not lead to bias if the deviation of the true level of
the white share from the trend is independent of the level of the trend, i.e., the true white share
varies randomly about the trend. As an additional check on our procedure we apply it to data at
a higher level of geographical aggregation (local authorities), where annual series on residents
by country of birth are available. The correlation between our interpolated series and the actual
series is 0.98, providing reassurance about the interpolation procedure.
15 We will also compare our results with what can be obtained by running the analysis measuring diversity with respect
to the country of birth. Results are discussed at the end of Section 5.
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The existing literature uses a variety of measures to summarise the ethnic mix of an area. One
popular measure is the fractionalisation index (see, e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000), which is
defined as:
FRACn = 1 −
∑
g
s2gn, (1)
where sgn is the share of ethnic group g in neighbourhood n. This can be interpreted as the chance
that two randomly chosen people in the area belong to different groups.16 The fractionalisation
index is simply one of many possible ways in which the ethnic mix of a neighbourhood might
affect outcomes. It might be that it is only the share of one’s own ethnic group that is important
or it might be the shares of particular ethnic groups. Or it might also be that it is the immigrant
share rather than the ethnic group that is important. In the UK, historically, most minorities
were migrants and most migrants were minorities. But this correlation has weakened over time:
many minorities are now UK–born and there has been substantial white immigration into the UK
following the accession of the Eastern European A8 countries into the EU in 2004.
In principle, one can distinguish between these different hypotheses by conducting a ‘horse
race’, testing one measure against another and seeing which has the greatest explanatory power.
In practice, we do not have enough power in the data to resolve this question beyond reasonable
doubt as there is a high degree of collinearity between different possible diversity measures
as shown in Table 4.17 For example, the correlation between the white share and the ethnic
fractionalisation index is −0.96 because there are only a small number of neighbourhoods where
the minority share is very high.18 The practical implication is that one cannot distinguish clearly
between the hypothesis that it is the white share that is the relevant neighbourhood characteristic
or the fractionalisation index. This is in spite of the fact that these have different implications,
e.g., a linear effect of the white share implies a monotonic relationship between the white share
and outcomes while the fractionalisation index does not—however, the values of the white share
where they are different is sparse in our data.
After some experimentation we decided to use the white share as the diversity measure in our
main specification, as this can be considered a parsimonious model for diversity that seems to
work best for most specifications (see Becares et al., 2011, for another study that uses ethnic group
shares as the diversity measure). But we recognise that others might prefer other variables, and
we also present results for a variety of alternative specifications—including the fractionalisation
index and the shares of people in the other ethnic groups as additional variables, as well as the
shares of migrants and of Muslims. While we do think that our article presents robust evidence
that there is an impact of some measure of ethnic mix on neighbourhood satisfaction, we also
think that the exact measure of the ethnic mix that is important remains a more open question.
One other issue that we do not explore is the difference between fractionalisation and segrega-
tion (e.g., see Alesina and Zhuravskhaya, 2011; Uslaner, 2012). Many measures of segregation
(see Massey and Denton, 1988, for a classic review) depend not just on the ethnic composition of
the own neighbourhood but on its comparison with the ethnic composition of a wider area (e.g.,
16 An alternative interpretation relates to individuals putting a positive weight on their own-group share so that the
‘treatment’ effect varies across ethnic groups within their neighbourhood. The fractionalisation index is then the average
treatment effect across neighbourhoods.
17 Information on the country of birth is also available for the 1991–2011 censuses but the country of birth classification
changes quite extensively across censuses. To estimate the migrant mix we use four groups that are consistently available
throughout all censuses: the United Kingdom, Ireland, Europe and other countries.
18 Fewer than 1% of the LSOAs have a proportion of white people that is lower than 50% white in 1991, and, even
though the white share fell over time, only 5% of areas had less than 50% white residents in 2011.
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Table 4. Correlations Between Measures of Diversity.
White share Ethnic F-index
Ethnic F-index
(non-whites)
Immigrant
F-index Asian share
White share 1
Ethnic F-index −0.958* 1
Ethnic F-index
(non-whites)
−0.161* 0.238* 1
Immigrant F-index −0.853* 0.906* 0.290* 1
Asian share −0.904* 0.804* 0.062* 0.702* 1
Black share −0.727* 0.773* 0.219* 0.688* 0.382*
Immigrant share −0.886* 0.902* 0.247* 0.979* 0.745*
Immigrant share (EU) −0.528* 0.617* 0.293* 0.822* 0.351*
Immigrant share (RoW) −0.927* 0.918* 0.209* 0.944* 0.811*
Muslim share −0.692* 0.580* −0.013* 0.472* 0.804*
Unemployment rate −0.163* 0.166* 0.020* 0.091* 0.113*
Black share Immigrant
share
Immigrant share
(EU)
Immigrant share
(RoW)
Muslim share
Immigrant share 0.696* 1
Immigrant share (EU) 0.488* 0.797* 1
Immigrant share (RoW) 0.704* 0.979* 0.657* 1
Muslim share 0.245* 0.494* 0.182* 0.555* 1
Unemployment rate 0.205* 0.097* 0.042* 0.107* 0.134*
Notes: Correlations are estimated for the universe of the LSOAs, for the years for which census data are available, namely
1991, 2001 and 2011. Please refer to Online Appendix A for a description of the variables included. F-index denotes
fractionalisation index. Unemployment rate vs. unemployment rate correlation cells are excluded from the table for the
sake of space. Immigrant share (EU) is the share of residents born outside UK and inside the EU, while Immigrant share
(RoW) is the share of residents born in a non-EU country. * p < 0.01.
a city), and the segregation index applies to this larger area. A neighbourhood with a low white
share would not be classed as a segregated neighbourhood if surrounding areas also had the same
white share. Which measures affect people’s welfare is ultimately an empirical matter,19 but it
is perhaps plausible that it is the ethnic composition of the local neighbourhood itself that is the
most important. However, Echenique and Fryer (2007) develop a ‘spectral segregation index’
that can be used to compute measures of segregation for individuals using information on social
networks. We do not have direct measures of social networks but if all connections are within the
neighbourhood and those connections are drawn at random from people in the neighbourhood
then the spectral segregation index corresponds to the white share (Ballester and Vorsatz, 2014).
So our preferred measure of diversity can—under some assumptions—be given a theoretical
justification.
2.2. Other Neighbourhood Characteristics
Even though our main interest is in the measures of diversity described above, our speci-
fications include time-varying controls for deprivation, which is likely to be another factor
influencing satisfaction and which has received a lot of attention in the UK literature (e.g.,
Demireva and Heath, 2014, inter alia). We use two measures. The first is the ‘claimant count’ (an
19 We provide some comparison with the effect of diversity calculated at different spatial scales in the Online Appendix,
finding that our results are almost entirely explained by the local area level variation rather than the one measured at
higher layers.
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administrative measure of the numbers claiming jobseeker’s allowance, the UK’s unemployment-
related benefit) normalised by the working-age population so this can be interpreted as a measure
of the unemployment rate, and we refer to it as such. The claimant count is available at the
LSOA level on an annual basis through NOMIS.20 We include this as a control variable in all
our specifications. The second is the UK government’s Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) that
combines a range of indicators of disadvantage including the claimant count and crime rates.
This is the measure of deprivation most commonly used in the existing literature for the UK
(e.g., Demireva and Heath, 2014). The IMD is available at five-yearly intervals so has to be
interpolated for intervening years. There is the concern that some of the indicators in the IMD
might be considered as potential outcomes, and the IMD varies in the way it is constructed across
UK countries. However, our results are robust to whether we include or exclude the IMD. As an
additional time-varying area-level control, we include the fraction of households in the area who
are homeowners: we experimented with other time-varying controls (details are given in Section
4) but this was the only one we found to be significant.
In specifications that do not include neighbourhood fixed effects we control for some other
time-invariant area characteristics, namely the 1971 country of birth mix,21 the 1991 industrial
composition, the size of the neighbourhood and a dummy for the urbanisation of the area
in 1991.22 This is important as some studies (e.g., Sturgis et al., 2011) have argued that the
estimated impacts of diversity are sensitive to the other neighbourhood controls that are included.
We now turn to the empirical specification we use.
3. Empirical Specification
We are interested in how the white share (or some other neighbourhood characteristics) af-
fects an outcome variable, y. Suppose we can model the outcome variable for individual i in
neighbourhood n in period t , yint , as:
yint = βnWn(i,t)t + βcxcint + uint , (2)
where xcint are individual and neighbourhood characteristics, while Wnt is the white share in
neighbourhood n in period t and n(i, t) denotes the neighbourhood in which individual i is living
in period t . uint is a residual that might have both a neighbourhood and an individual component.
We typically have a relatively small number of observations per neighbourhood but this is not a
problem unless the selection of the sampled individuals within neighbourhoods is biased in some
way and the data is not constructed in a way that would lead to such a bias.
There are several issues associated with the estimation of (2). First, it might be that even if
people were randomly assigned to their neighbourhoods (which they are not), the white share is
correlated with unobserved neighbourhood characteristics so that the errors in (2), uint , are not
independent of the white share Wnt and OLS estimation of (2) would lead to bias. One strategy
for dealing with this issue is to control for a wide range of neighbourhood characteristics and
to exploit our longitudinal data by including individual, area fixed effects, and combinations
20 This corresponded to the count of the number of people claiming jobseeker’s allowance (JSA) from 1996 until
2012. With the introduction of the universal credit system in 2013, means-tested elements of JSA have been replaced by
this new system (Nomis, Official Labour Market Statistics).
21 Constructed upon five ‘country of birth’ groups: United Kingdom and Europe, Africa, India, Pakistan and other
countries: data from 1971 Census of population.
22 Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for those control variables.
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of them. This may not eliminate all sources of bias (e.g., there could be other time-varying
covariates) so our main strategy is to instrument for the white share (the precise instrument is
described later), i.e., to assume that there is a set of instrumental variables znt independent of uint
but correlated with Wnt . The first stage of this instrumental variable approach will then be:
Wnt = πnznt + πcxint + ηint ≡ ˆWn(i,t)t + ηint . (3)
3.1. Sample Selection
Even if one assumes that Wnt is independent of unobserved neighbourhood characteristics,
estimation of (2) faces an additional problem caused by the fact that each individual is only
observed in one neighbourhood in each period. The observed neighbourhood (and hence the
observed white share) is possibly correlated with uint as individuals are more likely to be found
in neighbourhoods that offer them higher utility. In other words, the neighbourhood in which we
observe people is the result of a choice. We do have evidence that people do respond in this way—
e.g., ‘white flight’, the process by which some US neighbourhoods and cities rapidly became
majority black (Card et al., 2008; Boustan, 2010, 2012, for the United States, and Kaufmann and
Harris, 2015, for the UK). A less dramatic example would be the literature on how immigration
into an area affects the migration decisions of natives (Borjas, 1987, 1994; Borjas et al., 1996;
Card and Di Nardo, 2000; Card, 1990, 2001, 2005; Saiz and Wachter, 2011; Amior, 2019).
This source of bias cannot be resolved by including fixed effects or instrumenting the neigh-
bourhood white share so requires a different approach. The first step of the approach that we use
to deal with the choice process is to substitute (3) into (2) to have:
yint = βn ˆWnt + βcxcint + βnηint + uint . (4)
We then assume that neighbourhood choice is based on the maximisation of some objective
function, Vint , which is given by:
Vint = γ nWnt + γ cxcit + νint , (5)
where the residuals νint may be correlated with (ηint , uint ) but are assumed independent of the
instruments znt . Substituting (3) into (5) leads to:
Vint = γ n ˆWnt + γ cxcit + γ nηint + νint . (6)
Following Das et al. (2003), we also assume that the expectation of the error in (4) can be written
as a function of the propensity scores,pint , the probability of individual i choosing neighbourhood
n, conditional on the covariates, and the neighbourhood being chosen. In the non-binary case,
this will generally be the probabilities of choosing all neighbourhoods, not just the chosen one.23
That is, one can write (4) as:
E [yint |Xint , Dint = 1] = βn ˆWnt + βcxcint + λ (pi1t , . . . , piNt ) , (7)
where are Xint all the individual and area level characteristics for which we control, and Dint
is a binary variable taking the value 1 if individual i is observed in neighbourhood n at time
t . The final term, λ(pi1t , . . . , piNt ), can be thought of as a more complicated version of the
23 This might seem an arbitrary assumption but it is satisfied by all the most commonly used discrete choice models.
See Das et al. (2003) for details. Dahl (2002), building on Lee (1983), presents assumptions under which the sample
selection term depends only on the probability of the chosen option—as this probability depends on the payoffs from all
options this leads to an empirical formulation similar to the more general case.
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familiar sample selection correction term popularised by Heckman (1976, 1979). Using (6), the
propensity scores can be written in the following form:
pijt = pj
[
γ n
(
ˆW1t − ˆWnt
)
, . . . , γ n
(
ˆWNt − ˆWnt
)]
. (8)
The propensity scores have this form because only the differences in the white shares affect
choices, whereas the individual characteristics cancel out. In our context, where the number
of neighbourhoods that an individual might choose is very large, it is not computationally
straightforward to estimate (7) and (8) in its general form. Our approach is to approximate the
terms using a linear form. That is, we write (7) as:
E [yint |Xint , Dint = 1] = βn ˆWnt + βcxcint +
∑
j =n
ωnj [γ n
(
ˆWjt − ˆWnt
)], (9)
where ωnj is the weight put on the white share of neighbourhood j in influencing the sample
selection term for neighbourhood n. It is natural to assume that more distant neighbourhoods
have less influence and we assume that the weights have the form:
ωnj = e−αdnj , (10)
where dnj is the distance between the neighbourhoods and α is a measure of the cost of distance.
Using (10) in (9) leads to
E [yint |Xint , Dint = 1] = βn ˆWnt + βcxcint + βa
(
ˆW(∴n)t − ˆWnt
)
, (11)
where
ˆW(∴n)t =
∑
j =n
e−αdnj ˆWjt , (12)
i.e., the sample selection correction term is a function of the difference between the chosen
neighbourhood white share and a weighted average of other neighbourhood white shares.24 In
implementing (12) we use a value α = 0.03 derived from census data on residential moves,
though our results are not sensitive to this choice over plausible values.25 The sample selection
term can be interpreted as a first-order Taylor series approximation to the difference in utility
between living in this neighbourhood and others in a discrete choice model where one nest is the
current neighbourhood and the other nest is all other neighbourhoods.
The intuition for how one can distinguish between the impact of the absolute value of the white
share on neighbourhood satisfaction and sample selection is that the fact that people have to live
somewhere means that the choice of neighbourhood will be influenced by the white share in this
neighbourhood relative to that in other possible residential choices. So sample selection will be
determined by the relative, not the absolute, white share, as shown in (11).
Equation (11) is not quite estimable because it includes the predicted values for the white
share. To estimate the model, we replace with the actual white share and instrument it. For the
own neighbourhood we use an own-neighbourhood instrument and for the sample selection term
we use the equivalent relative instrument.
24 Weights ωnj are rescaled to sum up to 1.
25 Specifically, to determine the value of α we exploit LSOA level flow data from 2001 and 2011 censuses of
population. We estimate the probability of moving from one area to other group areas—based on the distance from the
area of origin—as a function of the distance between areas. The resulting α is approximately 0.03. As a robustness check,
we also set α to be equal to 1. Results are quite similar in magnitude to the ones displayed in the tables.
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3.2. Instrumental Variable
As an instrument for the white share we use a ‘shift-share’ instrument popularised by Altonji
and Card (1991) and Card (2001). This type of instrument builds on the idea that, for historical
reasons, area varies in terms of ethnic composition. Our main instrument for the ethnic shares
is constructed in the following way. Denote by ngn0 the population of minority group g in
neighbourhood n in some base year. Denote by Pgt the population of minority group g at time t
and by Pg0 the population of minority group g at some initial time. Then we define the predicted
share of each ethnic group g in neighbourhood n at time t , ŝgnt , based on national population
movements as:
sˆgnt =
ngn0
Pgt
Pg0∑
g′ ng′n0
Pg′t
Pg′0
. (13)
And we use as the instrument for the ethnic mix measure I (sˆ1nt,, . . . , sˆGnt ). In level equations
when we do not have neighbourhood fixed effects we control for the initial ethnic mix in the area:
this ensures that variation in the instrument comes from the interaction of initial ethnic mix and
the changing population shares of different ethnic groups in the UK as a whole.
We will use this instrumental variable method in most of our specifications.26 Our first stages,
reported in the Online Appendix, Table B3, are always very strong. Although this instrument
is common in the literature, two recent papers have raised concerns about its use. Goldmsith-
Pinkham et al. (2018) have argued that the Altonji–Card instrument is numerically equivalent
to using initial ethnic shares as instruments when there are only two periods of data for each
cross-sectional unit.27 But this is not the case when there are more than two periods, as in our
application. All our specifications include time effects and either baseline ethnic group shares or
neighbourhood fixed effects as controls so the variation exploited in the instrument comes from
the interaction of the time-varying national ethnic minority shares and the cross-neighbourhood
variation in initial ethnic minority shares. Ruist et al. (2018) argue that the high degree of
persistence in the shift-share instrument leads to a conflation of the short- and long-run responses
of the labour market to immigration shocks. It is not clear that the same pattern of dynamic
adjustment is so relevant in our application, but we obtain similar results if we follow the
recommendation of Ruist et al. (2018) and apply their ‘double instrument’ method using lagged
instruments.28
In our main specification the instrument is based on the current neighbourhood in which an
individual is living. An alternative is to construct an instrument based on the minority shares in
the initial neighbourhood in which the individual is observed. This has the advantage that the
baseline minority shares will not be influenced by subsequent mobility but has the disadvantage
that the instrument used would change as one varies the first period in which an individual is
observed and one still has to worry about the selection into the initial neighbourhood. The sample
selection term related to this can, however, be absorbed into individual fixed effects when they are
included. The correlation between these two instruments is very high—0.88—because residential
26 In some specifications we use an example analogous to this IV also for the sample selection control.
27 Their paper is actually framed in terms of discussion of the Bartik instrument (Bartik, 1991) for local demand
shocks, but the principle is the same.
28 More detailed discussion on this point appears in the following section.
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mobility rates are relatively low. So, in our preferred specifications the use of this instrument
does not alter the results very much.
4. Results for Overall Satisfaction with Neighbourhood
This section reports results for regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy taking value
1 for people answering Yes to the question Do you like your neighbourhood? On average, 92.6%
of people do. The variable we are interested in is the white share (our measure of diversity). To
convey the robustness of the results we report a wide range of specifications:
 With or without individual fixed effects, area fixed effects, (Individual × area) fixed effects,
and (individual + area) fixed effects
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (IV) models
 With and without corrections for sample selection
 In levels and differences.
These vary in the type of variation in the white share that is being used to estimate the
effect on neighbourhood satisfaction. These specifications are much more wide ranging and
demanding than those found in almost all of the existing literature. For example, Putnam (2007)
only presents cross-sectional evidence without any fixed effects, and without controlling for
endogeneity or sample selection (though there is a discussion of many of these issues). The
results for the levels specifications are contained in Table 5 and the differences specifications
in Tables 6 and 7. All specifications also contain controls for individual characteristics29 and a
variety of baseline neighbourhood characteristics,30 as well as time-varying measures of local
deprivation: the number of benefit claimants over working-age population, the IMD and the share
of home owners. Some of these characteristics only vary across individuals or over time, so will
be redundant in some fixed-effect specifications. All specifications cluster the standard errors at
LSOA level, the level at which the white share is computed.
4.1. Levels
The first column of the top panel of Table 5 shows the results for a model estimated by OLS and
without any individual or area fixed effects or sample selection effects but including individual
and neighbourhood characteristics. This specification is the closest to those estimated in most of
the existing literature on the impact of diversity.31 It uses variation in the white share across the
neighbourhoods chosen by different individuals and variation over time in the white share of the
same neighbourhood. There is a significant positive effect of the white share on neighbourhood
satisfaction—a fall of 10 percentage points (approximately the change over the period 1991–
2011) in the white share is estimated to reduce neighbourhood satisfaction by 1.3 percentage
29 Namely age—second degree polynomial; gender; working status dummies; marital status dummy; number of
children; ethnicity dummy—white vs not white; education dummies; and house tenure dummies. All regressions control
for wave fixed effects.
30 Country of birth fractionalisation index calculated according to 1971 census, shares of employees in each industrial
sector (one-digit SIC) in 1991. Other fixed geographical characteristics included are the size of the LSOA, a dummy for
urbanisation, and dummies for regions.
31 This is not to say that there are no studies that attempt to deal with endogeneity issues—for example, see Leigh
(2006) and Bjørnskov (2007) for papers using an IV approach in trust equations.
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Table 5. The Impact of the Ethnic Mix on How People Like Their Neighbourhood.
No sample selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE
Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
A1. OLS
White share 0.129*** 0.258*** 0.100* 0.201*** 0.207***
(0.019) (0.038) (0.055) (0.068) (0.070)
N 237,884 204,419 233,936 196,239 202,769
A2. OLS—Sample Selection
White share 0.157*** 0.294*** 0.114 0.187** 0.241**
(0.043) (0.075) (0.087) (0.091) (0.096)
N 237,884 204,419 233,936 196,239 202,769
B1. IV
White share 0.104*** 0.261*** 0.079 0.271*** 0.269***
(0.025) (0.047) (0.076) (0.096) (0.099)
N 233,697 200,433 229,786 192,496 198,806
KP 3405.482 2425.552 506.513 328.597 311.318
B2. IV—Sample Selection
White share 0.075 0.219** 0.087 0.198* 0.221*
(0.062) (0.102) (0.106) (0.118) (0.123)
N 233,697 200,433 229,786 192,496 198,806
KP 44.032 725.242 149.081 101.886 97.219
White share 0.098*** − 0.049 − 0.025 0.268*** 0.285***
(0.029) (0.156) (0.188) (0.101) (0.105)
N 233,732 200,498 229,793 192,551 198,859
KP 1112.013 147.779 195.646 281.851 264.085
C2. Initial area IV—Sample Selection
White share 0.078 − 0.028 0.108 0.199 0.209
(0.071) (0.140) (0.175) (0.124) (0.129)
N 233,732 200,498 229,793 192,551 198,859
KP 56.492 32.659 68.795 86.045 79.940
Notes: OLS is the baseline specification not including any fixed effects. Individual FE specifications include respondents’
fixed effects, Area FE include Lower Super Output Area fixed effects, Area × Individual FE include LSOA-individual
specific fixed effects, and Area + Individual FE include both LSOA and individual fixed effects, taken as separate sets.
Panel B shows Instrumental Variable estimates. Right-hand panels include controls for sample selection, as illustrated
by equation (13), with α equal to 0.03. IV-Sample Selection specifications use instrumental variables for both the share
of white people and for the corresponding sample selection variable. Sample selection coefficients are reported in Table
B4 of the Online Appendix. First stage coefficients for the endogenous variables are reported in Table B3 in the Online
Appendix. Please refer to Online Appendix A for a description of the control variables and of the variables of interest.
KP is the Kleibergen–Paap weak instrument statistic. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level in all
specifications. All regressions include individual, LSOA-level controls, and time fixed effects. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 ***
p < 0.001.
points. So column 1 of panel A1 suggests that diversity may be important. This is broadly
consistent with the findings in Letki (2008), who includes neighbourhood satisfaction as one
component of her ‘neighbourhood attitude’ index.
However, it is possible that these effects cannot be interpreted as causal, as they may be biased
for a number of reasons. It may be that the types of individuals who live in more diverse areas
are different in some unobserved way that also affects neighbourhood satisfaction. A natural way
to explore this hypothesis is to exploit the longitudinal nature of our data and include individual
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Table 6. The Impact of Ethnic Mix on How You Like Your Neighbourhood. First Difference
Results.
No Sample Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
within area ×
individual
A1. OLS
White share (first difference) 0.388*** 0.371*** 0.518***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.118)
White share (ITT) − 0.179 − 0.181
(0.150) (0.145)
N 171,082 171,083 171,082 156,684
A2. OLS—Sample Selection
White share (first difference) 0.642*** 0.746*** 0.482**
(0.101) (0.124) (0.134)
White share (ITT) 0.135 − 0.502***
(0.172) (0.205)
N 171,082 171,083 171,082 156,684
B1. IV
White share (difference) 0.339*** 0.311*** 0.913***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.210)
White share (ITT) − 0.130 0.287
(0.251) (0.239)
N 167,782 167,871 167,782 153,802
KP 4480.868 639.423 311.468 520.218
B2. IV—Sample Selection
White share (difference) 0.774*** 0.794*** 0.593**
(0.129) (0.133) (0.224)
White share (ITT) 0.085 − 0.268
(0.265) (0.283)
N 167,782 167,871 167,782 153,802
KP 255.135 303.831 147.322 256.762
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the LSOA level in parentheses. In each regression the dependent variable is a
dummy that takes value 1 if the respondent states that he/she likes the neighbourhood in which he/she lives. Please refer
to Online Appendix A for a description of the control variables and of the variables of interest. KP is the Kleibergen–Paap
weak instrument statistic. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001.
fixed effects—results when we do so are reported in column 2, panel A1. One is now using
variation in the white share for the same individual, both from changes within neighbourhoods
and changes that result from residential mobility. The diversity variable remains significantly
different from zero and the estimated effect is almost double that found in column 1, panel A1.
There is no a priori expectation about how the inclusion of individual fixed effects32 would be
expected to affect the estimate: our results imply that there is a negative correlation between
people who like all neighbourhoods (which is what the fixed effect measures) being less likely
to live in neighbourhoods with a high white share.
Column 3, panel A1 reports results when neighbourhood fixed effects are included.33 In this
specification the impact of the white share is smaller than that found in column 1, panel A1, as
well as less precisely estimated. That might be explained by the fact that minorities tend to live in
32 Individual fixed effects are slightly less than 22,000 in this specification.
33 Neighbourhood fixed effects are approximately 16,000 in this specification.
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Table 7. The Impact of Changes in the Ethnic Mix on How People Like Their Neighbourhood.
First Difference Results, Comparison of Results in Different Subsamples.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Never
moved
Moved at
least once
Moving
years
Not moving
years
A1. OLS
White share (first difference) 0.289** 0.383*** 0.368*** 0.383***
(0.140) (0.048) (0.048) (0.116)
N 84,971 86,111 24,871 146,211
A2. OLS—Sample Selection
White share (first difference) 0.269* 0.690*** 0.723*** 0.379***
(0.139) (0.111) (0.122) (0.116)
N 84,971 86,111 24,871 146,211
B1. IV
White share (difference) 0.248 0.329*** 0.310*** 0.599***
(0.250) (0.057) (0.057) (0.193)
N 83,396 84,386 24,222 143,560
KP 301.289 4433.471 4404.783 498.430
B2. IV—Sample Selection
White share (difference) 0.229 0.787*** 0.778*** 0.438**
(0.259) (0.132) (0.133) (0.210)
N 83,396 84,386 24,222 143,560
KP 178.641 309.666 524.672 247.783
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the LSOA level in parentheses. All specifications control for individual, LSOA
characteristics and time fixed effects. In each regression the dependent variable is a dummy that takes value 1 if the
respondent states to like the neighbourhood in which he/she lives. See Online Appendix A for a description of the control
variables and of the variables of interest. See Section 4 for a discussion of the various First Difference Specifications,
Instrumental Variables, and controls for sample selection. KP is the Kleibergen–Paap weak instrument statistic. Column
1 shows results for the subsample of people who always remained in the same LSOA, column 2 people who moved at
least once, column 3 people who moved at least once, keeping only the years when they moved and the year before that,
column 4 people who never moved or of people who moved, but keeping only years when they stayed in the same LSOA.
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001.
less desirable neighbourhoods. In this specification one is exploiting variation in the white share
within neighbourhoods over time but there might be correlations with individual characteristics
that we think are also important. For this reason, our preferred models control for both area and
individual fixed effects.34
Given the nature of our data, we can combine area and individual fixed effects in two ways. We
can include different fixed effects for each individual-area combination35 (column 4, panel A1),
i.e., a different fixed effect if an individual changes area. This specification exploits variation
in the white share as experienced by individuals who remain in the same area. The estimated
impact of the white share is now 2 percentage points for a 10 percentage points increase in the
white share. Alternatively, including both area and individual fixed effects separately36 (column
5, panel A1) leads to similar results to the Individual × area fixed effects estimates.
34 This may come at the cost of not being able to compare our results with area-level aggregate specifications for all
models, although we think that the gains in following this approach are higher as accounting for both fixed effects sets is
important in this context where we want to study individuals’ perceptions.
35 This leads to slightly less than 30,000 fixed effects.
36 This leads to slightly less than 31,000 fixed effects.
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Our fixed effects specifications do not control for the possible sample selection of individuals
into areas. For this reason, we include the sample selection variable that we illustrate in the
previous section—essentially, a weighted average of the diversity variable in the surrounding
neighbourhood. Results are shown in panel A2 of Table 5. When the sample selection term is
included, the estimated coefficients are mostly similar to those in the equivalent specification
without sample selection terms, although slightly less significant. The sample selection terms
themselves are not generally significant from zero, as shown in Table B5 of the Online Appendix.
This is not too surprising, given that the rates of residential mobility are low so that most
individuals are in the same neighbourhood from one year to the next. Given that the sample
selection term has little predictive power of this term and makes little difference to the results,37
most of the specifications reported in the rest of the article do not control for sample selection.
While the use of fixed effects and the included time-varying covariates (individual employment
status and neighbourhood deprivation and the fraction of home owners38) allay some concerns
about the endogeneity of the white share, it remains possible that it is correlated with some
other time-varying characteristic. For this reason, we also use an instrumental variable strategy
instrumenting the white share with variables that one can argue are uncorrelated with unobserved
neighbourhood characteristics. The IV estimates are in specifications in panel B1 that mirror the
specifications of panel A1. The first stages are reported in Table B6 in the Online Appendix. The
Kleibergen–Papp test statistic is reported and the values suggest that the instruments are generally
very strong. The estimated coefficients are similar to the OLS estimates though the standard errors
are larger and the coefficient estimate with area fixed effects only is not significantly different
from zero at conventional significance levels (the instrument becomes weaker in this case, though
still very strong). However, including individual as well as area fixed effects or an Individual ×
area fixed effect leads to larger and more significant estimated effects, as was the case for the
OLS counterparts. Overall, the results seem quite robust. Columns in panel B2 also include the
selection term and instrument for it with an IV that is essentially a weighted average of our Card
IV. Results are similar in signs, but in general noisier, but one should also take into account that
these are very demanding specifications: there are two endogenous variables once the sample
selection term is included, as well as a great number of fixed effects.
Panels C1 and C2 of Table 5 presents IV estimates with the alternative instrument discussed
earlier, based on the ethnic group shares of the neighbourhood in which an individual is first
observed in the sample. Results with just individual or area fixed effects are weaker in this case but
results with both types of fixed effects are similar to those with the other instrument. When sample
selection terms are included results are slightly weaker than their panel B1 and B2 counterparts,
although coefficients are quite similar in our preferred specifications (area and individual FE
combinations). However, the sample selection terms themselves are never significant (Table B4)
so that one can accept the hypothesis that sample selection is not important.
Table B7 in the Online Appendix investigates the robustness of our results using two methods
proposed by Ruist et al. (2018) to allay concerns about serial correlation in the instrument and
possible dynamic responses. In both cases results for the current white share are similar to our
baseline specification.
37 We experimented its inclusion for all models. In none of these is the selection term statistically relevant, nor does
it alter the results.
38 Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the full set of characteristics that we include in our specifications. As an additional
robustness check Table B5 in the Online Appendix shows that results are robust to controlling for the LSOA annual
average house price from the Land Registry data. As house price data is only available from 1995 and for England and
Wales only, and also could be argued to be endogenous itself, we prefer to keep this control out of our main analysis.
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Overall, Table 5 suggests a significant positive effect of the white share on neighbourhood
satisfaction. The estimates suggest that a fall in the white share of 10 percentage points is likely
to reduce neighbourhood satisfaction by 1–3 percentage points (the average of people dissatisfied
is 7.4%) with perhaps a central estimate a little above 2 percentage points.
4.2. First Differences
Equation (2) can also be written in first-differenced form as:

yint = βn
WFDit + βc
xcint + 
uint ,
where we define 
WFDit = Wn(i, t)t − Wn(i, t−1)t−1, using n(i, t) to represent the area in which
individual i lives at time t . This is the natural way to take the first difference, as the question
on neighbourhood satisfaction refers to the current neighbourhood. The first column of Table 6
reports estimates for the model in this form, both OLS (panels A1 and A2) and IV (panels B1
and B2) without and with sample selection.39 Column 1 estimates the model by OLS in panel A1
and by IV in panel B1. The OLS results are in line with the results for ‘levels’ that an increase
in the white share increases neighbourhood satisfaction (though the magnitude of the effect is
larger in the differences specification)—in the IV specification the results are quite similar.
For those who do not change neighbourhood (‘stayers’), 
WFDit is the change in the white
share within the neighbourhood, but for those who do change area (‘movers’) the first-difference
term also picks any change in the white share that comes from the change in location. The latter
source of variation might be thought to be problematic because the residential mobility decision is
clearly endogenous. To deal with this, one might consider estimating a model in which the change
in diversity is measured for the original area. This could be interpreted as an ‘intention to treat’
(ITT) estimator, as some individuals can avoid the change in the white share—the “treatment”
in this case—by moving to a different area, thus not receiving the ’treatment’. Hence, define

WIT Tit = Wn(i, t−1)t − Wn(i, t−1)t−1 i.e., the change in the white share experienced by the area
in which the individual was living last year.
The ITT estimate does not directly measure how much people care about the white share in
their current neighbourhood that is the main aim of our enquiry. Suppose that people do care
about diversity but that residential mobility is very high and the range of neighbourhoods on
offer is so great that any change in the current neighbourhood that one disliked could be avoided
by moving to another area. In this case the ITT estimate would be zero but it would be wrong
to conclude that people do not care about their neighbourhood—it would be more accurate to
say that residential mobility insures them against any changes that they do not like. Similarly, if
residential mobility itself is costly, one should not conclude that individuals do not care about
diversity on the basis that the ITT estimate is zero.
Using 
WIT Tit as the regressor leads to the results reported in column 2, panel A1, for the
OLS estimator and column 2, panel B1, for the IV estimator (we call this the ITT estimate). The
estimated coefficients are very different from the equivalent specifications in column 1 of panels
A1 and B1. Most strikingly, the coefficient on the ITT white share in the OLS specification
becomes negative, though not significantly different from zero.
39 First-differencing is an alternative way to eliminate individual fixed effects so we do not report specifications with
them included.
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To investigate the differences between the FD and ITT results, we include both white share
variables in the same regression, i.e., estimate:

yint = βn1 
WFDit + βn2 
WIT Tit + βc
xcit + 
uin(i,t)t . (14)
Column 3 of Panels A1 and B1 present estimates of (14). Column 3 of panel A1 shows that 
WFDit
always has a positive sign, significantly different from zero. However, conditional on 
WFDit ,

WIT Tit has a negative coefficient in most specifications but has a positive insignificant coefficient
in the instrumental variable estimate without sample selection. A significant negative effect of

WIT Tit could be interpreted as individuals experiencing relief if they have moved away from an
area that was becoming less white because they have avoided changes with which they would have
been uncomfortable. This explanation is speculative, but the results do suggest that neighbourhood
satisfaction may not simply be driven by characteristics of the current neighbourhood. Finally,
we also consider first-difference specifications within Individual × neighbourhood pairs, i.e.,
using only within area changes for each individual—these are reported in column 4, panel A1 for
OLS and panel B1 for IV.40 Also in this case we find that a higher white share is associated with
higher neighbourhood satisfaction. The right-hand panel of Table 6 presents estimates of fixed-
difference specifications with sample selection corrections. The first-difference specifications are
similar, though the instruments become weaker once sample selection is accounted for (panel A2
for OLS and B2 for IV results).
The estimates in Table 6 include both movers and stayers. There might be concerns that these
are very different groups with very different responsiveness of neighbourhood satisfaction to the
white share. The first column of Table 7 reports estimates for the first difference model estimated
on people who never moved in the period in which we observed them, both OLS (panels A1
and A2) and IV (panels B1 and B2) without and with sample selection. The second column
reports results for people who moved at least once in the sample. Column 3 shows results for
the same sub-population, but isolating only the years when respondents move. The last column
pools together information for people who never moved and people who moved, but keeping just
years when they do not move. Overall, the results are similar to those reported in Table 6.
4.3. Heterogeneity in Coefficients
One obvious concern with the estimates presented so far is that they assume that all individuals are
affected by neighbourhood characteristics in the same way, i.e., that the effects are homogeneous.
First, individuals might prefer to be surrounded by their own ethnic group so that the coefficient
on the white share would be different, possibly differently signed for whites and ethnic minorities.
Some 90.3% of the BHPS-UKHLS sample is white, so the estimates reported above will largely
reflect their preferences but the preferences of minorities might well be different.41 This has
been explored by Becares et al. (2011), who use data from the British Citizenship Survey that
over-samples ethnic minorities to investigate the impact of diversity and deprivation on social
cohesion. Table 8 replicates the specifications without sample selection of Table 5 for the sub-
sample of white respondents (panels A1 and A2) and of non-white respondents (panels B1 and
40 This approach is similar to the one used by Dustmann and Fasani (2016) to estimate the impact of crime on mental
health at the local level.
41 BHPS does not over-sample minorities, though UKHLS does. However, UKHLS is a small part of our sample. See
Knies et al. (2016) for an analysis of UKHLS data showing that people have higher life satisfaction when surrounded by
co-ethnics. The short sample period does not allow for as rich a set of covariates as we consider.
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Table 8. The Impact of the Ethnic Mix on How People Like Their Neighbourhood. Results by
Respondents’ Ethnic Group.
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE
Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
A1. OLS—Sub-sample: White respondents
White share 0.180*** 0.261*** 0.085 0.203*** 0.217***
(0.027) (0.039) (0.071) (0.076) (0.078)
N 226,186 198,740 222,324 190,787 197,113
A2. IV—Sub-sample: White respondents
White share 0.147*** 0.233*** 0.028 0.261** 0.254**
(0.035) (0.052) (0.103) (0.112) (0.116)
N 222,041 194,793 218,216 187,083 193,189
KP 2465.339 2559.929 387.600 301.158 286.300
B1. OLS—Sub-sample: Non-white respondents
White share 0.053** 0.181 0.056 0.018 0.018
(0.026) (0.122) (0.149) (0.182) (0.195)
N 11,698 5679 10,177 5452 5531
B2. IV—Sub-sample: Non-white respondents
White share 0.031 0.366** 0.118 0.138 0.075
(0.037) (0.146) (0.210) (0.254) (0.273)
N 11,656 5640 10,136 5413 5492
KP 1490.481 207.430 68.144 61.793 54.440
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All specifications control for individual, LSOA
characteristics and time-fixed effects. See notes of Table 5. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001.
B2). Not surprisingly, as they represent the vast majority of the sample, results for the white
sub-sample are quite similar to the results for the whole sample. For the non-white sub-sample,
results are positive in all specifications though smaller than the estimates for the white sub-sample
in eight out of ten specifications. But the estimates for the non-white sample are only significantly
different from zero in one specification. Although the positive coefficients are intriguing, the lack
of precision in the estimates means that it is dangerous to read too much into them—a Bonferroni
correction for the number of models estimated suggests that even the most significant estimate is
not significant at the 95% level.
Other differences often discussed are that elderly and less educated residents may be less
comfortable with diversity than the young and more highly educated residents, or that home
ownership is important because it affects the ability to move areas and any impact on house
prices might also be a consideration.
Table 9 investigates possible heterogeneity introducing in the baseline specifications inter-
actions of the diversity variable with individuals’ ethnicity, level of education, age, and home
ownership status.42 We present five sets of estimates, OLS and IV,43 with different combina-
tions of fixed effects, similarly to what we do for our main specifications (Table 5). There is
some evidence of heterogeneity in the results for the highly educated group, for the non-white
42 We also considered gender, but this was never significant.
43 First-stage coefficients for the IV models are shown in Table B8 in the Online Appendix for models that include
both area and individual fixed effects.
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Table 9. Heterogeneity of the Impact of Ethnic Mix on How People Like Their Neighbourhood.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE
Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
OLS
White share 0.190*** 0.299*** 0.158*** 0.176* 0.253***
(0.027) (0.058) (0.061) (0.106) (0.089)
White share × Non-white − 0.113*** 0.057 − 0.117** 0.019 − 0.007
(0.029) (0.106) (0.051) (0.165) (0.146)
White share × Higher educ. − 0.057*** − 0.199*** − 0.001 0.138 0.002
(0.020) (0.063) (0.021) (0.142) (0.085)
White share × Low
education
0.001 0.064 0.005 0.077 0.008
(0.003) (0.078) (0.003) (0.139) (0.098)
White share × No education − 0.001 0.015 0.004 − 0.113 − 0.187
(0.004) (0.095) (0.004) (0.146) (0.116)
White share × Age below
50
0.012*** 0.009** 0.008** − 0.002 − 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
White share × Homeowner 0.001 0.002 − 0.008 0.013 0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
White share × Social tenant − 0.030 − 0.002 − 0.015 0.018 − 0.021
(0.030) (0.063) (0.043) (0.082) (0.084)
N 237,884 204,419 233,936 196,239 202,769
IV
White share 0.150*** 0.251*** 0.175* 0.213 0.209
(0.038) (0.074) (0.090) (0.155) (0.135)
White share × Non-white − 0.089*** 0.241** − 0.100** 0.030 0.115
(0.032) (0.112) (0.050) (0.173) (0.151)
White share × Higher educ. − 0.088*** − 0.277*** − 0.019 0.178 0.027
(0.021) (0.072) (0.023) (0.158) (0.091)
White share × Low
education
0.002 0.092 0.005 0.114 0.081
(0.003) (0.094) (0.003) (0.172) (0.109)
White share × No education − 0.002 0.116 0.003 − 0.030 − 0.067
(0.004) (0.106) (0.004) (0.164) (0.122)
White share × Age below
50
0.012*** 0.008** 0.007* − 0.002 − 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
White share × Homeowner 0.022 0.093** − 0.026 0.014 0.051
(0.027) (0.043) (0.035) (0.051) (0.049)
White share × Social tenant − 0.019 0.019 − 0.057 − 0.066 − 0.080
(0.036) (0.069) (0.051) (0.097) (0.096)
N 233,697 200,433 229,786 192,496 198,806
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All specifications control for individual, LSOA characteristics and
time-fixed effects. See notes of Table 5. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001.
respondents and for older people. Results are not robust to the inclusion of area fixed effects and
to combinations of area and individual fixed effects.
4.4. Other Robustness Checks
In an earlier section we discussed how it is difficult to identify separately whether the right variable
to measure diversity is the white share or the fractionalisation index. So it is also possible that
our results could really be picking up the impact of some other correlated measure of diversity.
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For this reason, we explore results using alternative measures for diversity. Table 10 shows the
results obtained with IV strategy, while in the Online Appendix (Table B9) we show the OLS
counterpart. We use the fractionalisation index (panel A), a fractionalisation index computed
only on the non-white groups together with the white share (panel B), the white share and the
black share (panel C), the white share and the Asian share (panel D), the white share and the
Pakistani/Bangladeshi share (to pick up the possible hostility towards Muslims) (panel F), the
white share and the immigrant share (panel F) and the white share and the foreigner share,
separated by people born in Europe and people born in the rest of the world (panel G). An overall
theme is that there is a robust significant impact of diversity on neighbourhood satisfaction but
that the high degree of collinearity between different diversity measures means that one can be
less sure about exactly which aspect of diversity is important. When we compare the white share
coefficient to other group shares (panels B–G) the white share tends to prevail, although there is
loss of precision in some specifications, in particular when area fixed effects are introduced. One
intriguing aspect of the results reported in panels F and G is that the estimated impact of migrants
is positive, albeit not significantly different from zero in the preferred specifications. This might
be thought surprising, given that negative attitudes towards migrants played an important role in
the Brexit vote, but much of the hostility towards migrants is in areas with relatively low migrant
shares and Akay et al. (2017) found for Germany that more migrants led to higher levels of
subjective well-being. However, the standard errors are very large in this case because the white
and migrant shares are highly correlated (see Table 4).
In the existing UK literature on the impact of diversity on social capital, there is considerable
discussion of the impact of deprivation (Laurence and Heath, 2008; Letki, 2008; Andrews,
2009; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010; Twigg et al., 2010; Laurence, 2011; Becares et al., 2011;
Sturgis et al., 2011; Demireva and Heath, 2014). All our estimates control for the time-varying
unemployment rate as a measure of deprivation. There is perhaps some independent interest
in the impact of the unemployment rate on neighbourhood satisfaction (see also Kling et al.,
2007, and Ludwig et al., 2012 for the impact of neighbourhood poverty on various measures of
well-being) and these results are reported in Online Appendix C. There is a significant impact
of unemployment on neighbourhood satisfaction in some specifications, but not all. Because
one might also be concerned about the endogeneity of the unemployment rate, Appendix C also
reports results when it is treated as endogenous.
We have assumed that it is the LSOA that is the appropriate level of geographical aggregation
for affecting neighbourhood satisfaction. We check this using two alternative methods. First, we
estimate the same model using travel to work area (TTWA) fixed effects instead of neighbourhood
fixed effects (Table B10 in the Online Appendix), finding similar results. Second, we control
for measures of diversity calculated both at the neighbourhood and at the TTWA level, and we
find that the effect of neighbourhood level diversity is essentially unaltered in our preferred
specifications and is the most important factor (Table B11 in the Online Appendix).
Because data on ethnic mix are available only for census years, we use interpolation for the
intervening years. The use of interpolation for inter-censual years will lead to unbiased estimates
if the deviation of the true level of the white share from the trend is independent of the level of
the trend white share, i.e., the true white share varies randomly about the trend. In addition, as
reported earlier, our interpolation method works well at a higher level of geographical aggregation
for which annual data on the white share are available. Nevertheless, one might be concerned that
this interpolation influences the results in some ways. Table B12 in the Online Appendix presents
estimates when the sample is restricted to the three census years. In this case very few estimates
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Table 10. How Does the Ethnic Mix Affect How People Like Their Neighbourhood?
Comparison Between Different Specifications for Diversity. Instrumental Variable Results.
IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE
Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
A F-index − 0.094*** − 0.185*** − 0.088 − 0.213*** − 0.216***
(0.022) (0.036) (0.066) (0.079) (0.081)
N 233,697 200,433 229,786 192,496 198,806
KP 4357.835 4270.823 650.261 418.936 400.556
B White share 0.106*** 0.275*** 0.075 0.275*** 0.271***
(0.025) (0.048) (0.078) (0.097) (0.101)
F-index (non-white) − 0.008 − 0.051 − 0.080 − 0.101 − 0.121
(0.020) (0.036) (0.066) (0.073) (0.075)
N 224,241 191,535 220,437 183,905 189,963
KP 291.487 402.219 41.980 36.943 35.163
C White share 0.115*** 0.207*** 0.203 0.310 0.207
(0.027) (0.059) (0.232) (0.295) (0.299)
Black share 0.064 − 0.247* 0.723 0.224 − 0.355
(0.067) (0.145) (1.303) (1.636) (1.637)
N 233,697 200,433 229,786 192,496 198,806
KP 1014.995 976.386 5.400 3.445 3.491
D White share − 0.006 0.223** − 0.069 0.134 0.243
(0.049) (0.097) (0.294) (0.422) (0.429)
Asian share − 0.146** − 0.054 − 0.278 − 0.256 − 0.047
(0.057) (0.130) (0.525) (0.762) (0.774)
N 233,697 200,433 229,786 192,496 198,806
KP 753.883 807.403 19.359 12.579 11.900
E White share 0.089*** 0.174*** 0.037 0.226 0.278*
(0.031) (0.059) (0.121) (0.160) (0.164)
Muslim share − 0.035 − 0.238** − 0.163 − 0.187 0.038
(0.046) (0.117) (0.404) (0.640) (0.651)
N 233,697 200,433 229,786 192,496 198,806
KP 1537.608 396.713 13.231 7.397 7.110
F White share 0.261*** 0.637*** − 0.397 0.584 0.459
(0.044) (0.089) (0.630) (0.947) (0.935)
Foreigners share 0.312*** 0.712*** − 0.709 0.478 0.290
(0.080) (0.147) (0.944) (1.456) (1.435)
N 233,655 200,395 229,746 192,461 198,768
KP 542.721 328.233 17.085 9.586 9.916
G White share 0.378*** 0.779*** 0.466 0.573 0.807
(0.068) (0.123) (0.969) (1.941) (1.889)
EU foreigners − 0.162 0.088 − 0.676 0.479 0.278
(0.231) (0.428) (0.877) (1.480) (1.492)
Non-EU foreigners 0.588*** 1.073*** 1.081 0.456 1.019
(0.142) (0.274) (2.207) (4.372) (4.238)
N 233,655 200,395 229,746 192,461 198,768
KP 220.782 106.568 3.209 0.926 0.948
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All specifications control for individual, LSOA
characteristics and time-fixed effects. See notes to Table 5. Each panel corresponds to a different set of regressions. F-
index denotes fractionalisation index. Please refer to Online Appendix A for variables description. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05
*** p < 0.001.
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are significantly different from zero, but this is perhaps not surprising given that one is discarding
over 90% of the observations and that fixed effects specifications will be very demanding when
an individual can be observed at most three times in the data.
4.5. Summary
Most of the specifications that we report suggest that an increase in the white share increases
neighbourhood satisfaction among our (overwhelmingly white) sample. We find this in levels
and differences, with and without individual fixed effects, allowing for endogeneity and sample
selection. Most of the estimated coefficients are in the region 0.1–0.3 with perhaps a central
estimate around 0.2. As the white share has fallen by about 10 percentage points in the period
1991–2011 these estimates would imply that neighbourhood satisfaction has fallen by between 1
and 3 percentage points over this period because of rising diversity. This effect is not enormous
but the baseline probability is 92.5%, so this is perhaps a sizeable rise in the fraction who are not
satisfied with their neighbourhood.
5. Residential Mobility
One potential criticism of the analysis so far is that response to the neighbourhood satisfaction
question simply reflects people’s subjective response to which no significance can be attached.
One way of addressing this is to consider whether responses to the neighbourhood satisfaction
question are correlated with intentions to move neighbourhood (itself subjective) and actual
residential mobility.
In Table 11 we provide evidence that satisfaction with the neighbourhood has predictive power
for the decision to move. Panel A shows results for the actual moving. The dependent variable is
a binary variable taking the value 1 if the person is observed in a different LSOA in time t than in
time t-1. This is regressed on the lagged values of the neighbourhood satisfaction in columns 1–3
of the first row. In all specifications, a higher satisfaction is associated with a lower probability of
moving. The bottom part of panel A shows a reduced form counterpart of the previous models,
as it shows the results of a regression of the probability on moving on the white share. Results
show that the white share is negatively associated to the probability of moving once fixed effects
are taken into account. Panel B of Table 11 shows that current neighbourhood satisfaction is also
strongly correlated with the expression of an intention to move. Our conclusion is that responses
to the neighbourhood satisfaction question are informative as they can influence real-life choices.
6. Social Capital
Our analysis so far has focused on the impact of diversity on the level of satisfaction with the
neighbourhood. While we would argue that this is an outcome of interest as a summary measure
of how well the neighbourhood ‘works’ for individuals, much of the literature on the impact of
diversity on community focuses on two commonly used measures of ‘social capital’—generalised
trust and activity in organisations. This section considers these two outcomes. These questions
are asked in fewer years than neighbourhood satisfaction so the sample sizes are much smaller.
A number of prominent authors have suggested that diversity erodes generalised trust (e.g.,
Putnam, 2007)—a view that has been the subject of considerable controversy (e.g., Nannestad,
2008; Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Gerritsen and Lubbers, 2010; Uslaner, 2012).
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Table 11. Actual Moving and Propensity to Stay in the Area. Linear Probability Models.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A No FE Individual FE Area FE FD (lagged)
Dependent variable: Actual moving
Like your neighbourhood (lagged) − 0.080*** − 0.105*** − 0.083*** − 0.037***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
N 209,980 178,617 205,624 149,162
White share (lagged) 0.032*** − 0.197*** − 0.108*** − 0.048
(0.008) (0.046) (0.050) (0.036)
N 324,960 314,481 322,848 250,387
IV
White share (lagged) 0.035*** − 0.265*** − 0.198** − 0.078*
(0.011) (0.067) (0.080) (0.043)
N 320,381 309,991 318,254 246,747
(1) (2) (3)
B No FE Individual FE Area FE
Dependent variable: Propensity to stay
Like your neighbourhood 0.479*** 0.357*** 0.407***
(0.007) (0.017) (0.009)
N 69,223 34,083 64,670
White share 0.055*** 0.277*** − 0.079
(0.021) (0.081) (0.132)
N 100,278 79,239 97,391
IV
White share − 0.000 0.275** − 0.083
(0.026) (0.121) (0.178)
N 99,009 78,146 96,158
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All specifications control for individual, LSOA
characteristics and time-fixed effects. Actual moving is a dummy that takes value 1 if the respondent is observed in two
different LSOAs from one year to the other. Propensity to stay is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent
states that he/she is willing to stay in the area. See notes of Table 5. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001.
Our method for controlling for sample selection into neighbourhoods has rarely found evidence
that this is important in practice, perhaps unsurprising given the low rate of residential mobility.
In the interest of brevity and clarity, the estimates that follow only report specifications without
controls for sample selection44—though our results are very similar if they are included.
The two upper panels of Table 12 present results using generalised trust as the outcome variable.
We find no strong evidence that diversity affects the level of trust even in the OLS model without
fixed effects that is closest to the specification commonly estimated in the existing literature.
This result is very different from the conventional wisdom on the topic mostly derived from US
evidence. It could be that there is no inevitable close link between generalised trust and diversity
and that the US results are driven by the particular interactions between ethnic groups within that
society that do not translate to other societies. An alternative reason may be that the geographical
level of our study is different from that used in other studies. For this reason, Table B13 in the
Online Appendix reports results with white shares calculated at the TTWA level—again, we do
not find any robust impact of the white share on generalised trust.
As an alternative measure of social capital we use a dummy variable, taking value 1 for
people who are active in at least one organisation, and results are reported in the two lower
44 This applies to all specifications in this work, apart from the ones presented in Table 5 and its Appendix counterparts.
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Table 12. Impact of the Ethnic Mix on Trust and Participation to Organisation, Results in
Levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE
Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
A1. OLS—Dependent variable: Generalised trust
White share 0.041* 0.016 − 0.073 − 0.074 − 0.097
(0.024) (0.051) (0.129) (0.150) (0.169)
N 100,867 66,411 97,037 60,632 64,942
A2. IV—Dependent variable: Generalised trust
White share − 0.024 0.106 0.172 0.197 0.184
(0.030) (0.071) (0.196) (0.224) (0.255)
N 98,969 64,802 95,179 59,229 63,367
KP 3294.731 1213.763 845.157 511.037 392.686
B1. OLS—Dependent variable: Active in any organisation
White share − 0.016 − 0.059 − 0.103 − 0.063 − 0.062
(0.022) (0.047) (0.071) (0.101) (0.108)
N 160,222 123,062 156,438 114,256 121,068
B2. IV—Dependent variable: Active in any organisation
White share 0.006 − 0.015 0.164 0.255 0.219
(0.029) (0.060) (0.109) (0.168) (0.178)
N 157,820 120,922 154,082 112,413 118,971
KP 5018.704 2312.934 514.931 300.484 265.545
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All specifications control for individual, LSOA
characteristics and time fixed effects. See notes to Table 5. Generalised trust is a dummy that takes value 1 for respondents
who answer affirmatively to the question ‘Do you, in general, trust others?’. Active in any organisation is a dummy that
takes value 1 if respondents actively participate to at least one of the organisations of which they are members. * p < 0.1
** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001.
panels of Table 12. We find no significant impact of diversity on activity in organisations in any
specification. Some positive effects are found in the TTWA specification—shown in the bottom
panel of Online Appendix Table B13—but these effects are not as robust as one would have
expected from the previous literature.
7. Other Neighbourhood Outcomes
So far we have investigated the impact of diversity on neighbourhood satisfaction and residential
mobility. While there is some impact on overall satisfaction, we have not provided any evidence
on the aspects of the neighbourhood that changes that influence overall satisfaction. This section
investigates this. We consider possible impacts on the perception of crime, the quality of local
services and the quality of one’s social life.
7.1. Fear of Crime
The questions asked about perceptions and fear of crime are listed in Table 1. We start by
analysing the answers to whether the respondent worries about being a victim of crime because
the sample size is largest for this question. The results are shown in Table 13, in which the top
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Table 13. Impact of the Ethnic Mix on Crime Perceptions, Results in Levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE
Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
OLS
White share −0.075*** −0.178** −0.597*** −0.626*** −0.616***
(0.023) (0.082) (0.127) (0.163) (0.199)
N 74,738 35,807 70,345 28,821 33,716
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
IV
White share −0.043 −0.262** −1.118*** −1.352*** −1.322***
(0.031) (0.114) (0.195) (0.268) (0.329)
N 73,612 35,002 69,275 28,260 32,978
KP 4414.965 1099.753 906.296 499.312 332.266
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All specifications control for individual, LSOA
characteristics and time-fixed effects. See notes of Table 5. Dependent variable: 1 if affirmative answer to ’Are you
worried of being victim of a crime?’ * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001.
panel reports OLS estimates with a variety of individual and area fixed effects and the bottom
panel the equivalent specifications but using IV. The estimates suggest that a higher white share
is associated with a significantly lower level of concern about crime. Results are both strong and
generally robust. We also explore the impacts of the white share on perceptions of the likelihood
of particular types of crime, and the results are displayed in Table 14. Coefficients are the same
sign for most types of crime, but not all: e.g., racial insults/attacks seem a bit different. However,
estimated coefficients are almost never significant in the specifications that combine area and
individual fixed effects. This likely reflects the small sample sizes for many of these questions.
These questions all relate to fear of crime, but this may not be the same as actual crime. For
example, the literature on the link between migration and crime sometimes finds an impact on
fear of crime but little impact on actual crime once one controls for labour market status (that
would be expected to affect crime incentives, as argued by Becker, 1968).45 Unfortunately, we do
not have access to actual crime rates at LSOA level for all years. We can use information on the
crime index that is part of the IMD. The crime domain of IMD groups together information on
four types of crime—burglary, theft, criminal damage, and violence—which is available for the
years 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2015. Scotland and Wales use different and non-comparable indices
from England, so the results are valid for England only. Table 15 shows results for OLS and IV46
in a setting that controls for LSOA fixed effects. The white share has a small, though precisely
45 Bell and Machin (2013) provide a broader literature review on the topic; here we report some of the most recent
works on the argument. In the United States, Chalfin (2014) finds no causal effect of Mexican migration on crime.
Spenkuch (2014) finds that there is some small effect, concentrated on property and financial crimes, and for migrants
with low labour market prospects. Moehling and Piehl (2009) and Moehling and Piehl (2014) find that prison commitment
rates for new migrants is in general lower or equal to the natives’ one. Evidence from Europe has been targeted mostly in
studying the EU enlargements during the 2000s. Bell, Fasani and Machin (2013), Bianchi et al. (2012), Mastrobuoni and
Pinotti (2015) find modest effect of migration on property crimes only. Nunziata (2015) finds no effect on victimisation,
but a significant impact on fear of crime. Sa` (2015) finds that the negative effect of migration on house prices is not
explained by any migration-related increase in crime.
46 In this specification we treat both the white share and the unemployment rate as endogenous variables, in a similar
fashion to what we do in Online Appendix C. Results do not differ substantially if only the white share is treated as
endogenous.
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Table 14. Impact of the Ethnic Mix on Crime Perceptions, Alternative Measures. IV Results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE
Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
Dependent variable: Feel unsafe walking alone at night
White share −0.128*** −0.243** 0.092 −0.037 −0.038
(0.026) (0.103) (0.170) (0.233) (0.286)
N 73,574 34,930 69,233 28,220 32,909
KP 4413.448 1095.835 899.707 499.608 332.280
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
Dependent variable: Likely home broken into
White share −0.156** −0.311** −0.355 −0.542* −0.484
(0.067) (0.144) (0.298) (0.316) (0.407)
N 32,191 25,381 30,702 19,421 23,272
KP 859.824 972.522 442.735 437.484 260.888
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
Dependent variable: Likely car stolen/broken into
White share −0.055 −0.073 0.115 −0.135 −0.118
(0.042) (0.100) (0.207) (0.244) (0.315)
N 32,202 25,381 30,693 19,344 23,288
KP 830.083 990.345 432.315 416.042 247.917
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
Dependent variable: Likely people being attacked on the street
White share −0.151*** −0.263** −0.172 −0.280 −0.255
(0.049) (0.107) (0.232) (0.259) (0.334)
N 32,517 25,720 31,023 19,616 23,589
KP 882.202 969.096 449.234 437.285 261.278
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
Dependent variable: Likely racial insults/attacks
White share −0.222*** −0.264*** 0.128 0.273 0.291
(0.045) (0.097) (0.182) (0.219) (0.284)
N 32,126 25,333 30,623 19,273 23,209
KP 900.758 990.306 451.774 431.569 257.315
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
Dependent variable: Likely vandalism
White share −0.012 −0.265** −0.320 −0.528* −0.529
(0.060) (0.127) (0.283) (0.313) (0.404)
N 32,827 26,055 31,341 19,845 23,938
KP 863.427 1040.206 455.516 456.819 272.831
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All specifications control for individual, LSOA
characteristics and time-fixed effects. See notes of Table 5. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001.
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Table 15. Ethnic Mix and Actual Crime Index.
(1) (2) (3)
OLS—Area level
controls
IV—Endogenous
white share
IV—Endogenous
unemployment and
white share
% Unemployment − 0.004*** − 0.005*** − 0.103**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.042)
% White 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
% below age 16 0.001 0.001 0.009**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
% above age 65 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
% of homeowners 0.005*** 0.005*** − 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% of social tenants − 0.009*** − 0.009*** − 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Log of population 0.296*** 0.290*** 0.181***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.060)
% with no qualifications − 0.008*** − 0.008*** − 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
% with low qualifications − 0.010*** − 0.009*** − 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
% with high qualifications − 0.011*** − 0.010*** − 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Observations 129,921 129,921 129,921
R-squared 0.873 0.873 0.886
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All regressions take into account year and area-level
fixed effects. All shares are in % terms. Regressions are at the LSOA level. The actual crime index is taken from the
crime section of the Index of Multiple Deprivation for England; the dependent variable is the standardised rank version
of it. Details on the Index of Multiple Deprivation are in Online Appendix A. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001.
estimated, positive impact on the crime rates measured by the IMD.47 Even though—for data
issues—these results are not directly comparable to the specifications that we estimate for crime
perceptions, and more research would be useful, we take this as suggestive that diversity is likely
to influence fear of crime more than actual crime.
7.2. Quality of Local Services
Table 16 does a similar exercise for the quality of local services index, which is the first principal
component of the quality of local services variables in Table 1. Results are generally of negative
sign, but never statistically significant. One should note that the sample sizes for these outcomes
are even smaller than for the fear of crime variable, which might partly explain the large standard
errors. To try to dig a bit deeper on this aspect—although the sample size gain is not really
significant—we estimate the model for the single measures that compose our quality of local
services index, and the results are shown in Table B14 in the Online Appendix.48 In general, the
white share does not seem significantly related to any of the local services outcomes, apart from
an apparent negative impact on the quality of transportation.
47 In contrast with that, unemployment rates have a larger impact on crime rates.
48 Results on additional measures of neighbourhood perceptions (not included in the index) related to the neighbour-
hood general aspect are shown in Table B15 in the Online Appendix.
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Table 16. Impact of the Ethnic Mix on the Quality of Services in the Area, Results in Levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE
Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
OLS
White share 0.117 0.286 −0.125 −0.856 −0.838
(0.147) (0.330) (0.551) (0.584) (0.764)
N 22,542 15,366 20,808 11,994 13,610
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
IV
White share 0.073 0.704 −0.451 −0.752 −0.814
(0.186) (0.439) (0.736) (0.796) (1.044)
N 22,092 15,074 20,408 11,810 13,380
KP 704.514 673.866 333.089 302.148 173.495
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All specifications control for individual, LSOA
characteristics and time-fixed effects. See notes of Table 5. Dependent variable: Quality of services in the area index, see
Table B2 in the Online Appendix for the analysis used to construct the index. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001.
Table 17. Impact of the Ethnic Mix on the Quality of Social Life, Results in Levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE
Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
OLS
White share 0.292** 0.187 0.306 0.595 0.589
(0.122) (0.228) (0.447) (0.392) (0.507)
N 32,040 25,217 30,496 19,232 23,021
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No FE Individual FE Area FE Individual × Area
FE
Individual + Area
FE
IV
White share 0.247 0.200 0.329 0.690 0.698
(0.160) (0.304) (0.608) (0.569) (0.736)
N 31,367 24,657 29,860 18,909 22,556
KP 1051.363 953.152 463.964 458.805 273.196
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the LSOA level. All specifications control for individual, LSOA
characteristics and time-fixed effects. See notes of Table 5. Dependent variable: Quality of social life index, see Table
B2 in the Online Appendix for the analysis used to construct the index. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.001.
7.3. Quality of Social Life
Table 17 does a similar exercise for the quality of social life index, which is the first principal
component of the quality of social life variables in Table 1. All the estimated coefficients are
positive, suggesting that a high white share is associated with a higher quality of social life for
our respondents. However, the standard errors are very large, so that coefficients are almost never
significant. Table B16 in the Online Appendix presents results for the individual components of
the index, though estimated results are rarely significantly different from zero.
Overall, there is no strong evidence of a link between the white share and the quality of social
life. As the social life measures could be seen as an indicator of social capital, our results are
perhaps in line with those for generalised trust. One interpretation is that, unlike the United
States, there is no strong link between diversity and social capital in the UK.
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8. A Production Function for Neighbourhood Satisfaction
So far we have documented what we have argued are the causal effects of neighbourhood
characteristics on various measures of feelings about neighbourhoods, from high-level overall
satisfaction to different domains such as social capital, fear of crime, quality of local services
and social life. One hypothesis is that feelings about specific domains go into producing an
overall satisfaction with the neighbourhood. A simple linear production function for individual
i’s overall satisfaction, SATi , would be:
SATi =
∑
j
βjfji + βcxi + i, (15)
where fji is the level of feeling about domain j for individual i e.g., the fear of crime or the
quality of local services. What we have estimated are the impact of neighbourhood characteristics
on these feelings, i.e. :
fji = γiWi + γ cj xi + uji, (16)
Substituting (16) into (15) implies that overall satisfaction can be written as:
SATi =
⎡
⎣∑
j
βjγj
⎤
⎦Wi +
⎡
⎣βc +∑
j
βjγ
c
j
⎤
⎦ xi + i +∑
j
βjuji,
which is what we have also estimated in our equations for overall neighbourhood satisfaction.
What is not identified in this estimates are the factor loadings: the βj on different domains in
(15). These are, however, of some interest, e.g., whether crime or social interaction is the main
transmission channel from neighbourhood characteristics to overall satisfaction. Ideally, one
would estimate (15) instrumenting the different domains using the first stages implied by (16).
However, this approach only works if we have at least as many instruments as domains and there
is independent variation in the domains. See Table 18.
In the absence of our ability to do that, we report estimates of (15) by OLS. These estimates
cannot be given a causal interpretation, but we think that they can be suggestive and so are of
some interest. Results that include factors49 for the different groups of variables are reported in
Table 18.50 Columns 1, 4 and 7 report estimates of neighbourhood satisfaction on the various
domains, i.e., (15) without fixed effects (column 1), with individual fixed effects (column 4)
and with both area and individual fixed effects (column 7). Neighbourhood satisfaction is, as
one might expect, positively related to social capital, quality of local services and social life
and negatively related to the fear of crime though the significance of social capital and local
services does not survive the introduction of individual fixed effects. In columns 2, 5 and 8 we
estimate a model on this sample including only the white share; the estimated effects are slightly
larger than in our full sample. Columns 3, 6 and 9 include both the white share and the domain
satisfaction measures. The inclusion of the other factors reduces the impact of the white share in
both the OLS and the Individual fixed effects models, though not for the area fixed effects model
(though standard errors are large). This suggests that our factors do explain some of the impact
of the white share on neighbourhood satisfaction, though the white share still has explanatory
49 Factors are obtained grouping single variables with principal component analysis techniques, we then standardised
the indices obtained for interpretation purposes.
50 Table B17 in the Online Appendix reports results obtained including all variables. In both cases, as there is no year
for which all questions are asked, information is pooled for the two closest years in which information is available.
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power, which suggests that we have not identified all the channels through which diversity affects
satisfaction with the neighbourhood.
9. Conclusion
This article has investigated the impact of the white share of the population on a variety of
measures of neighbourhood satisfaction. Our estimates suggest that diversity does affect overall
neighbourhood satisfaction and the fear of crime (though not actual crime), thereby confirming
the general conclusion of the existing literature. However, there is one area in which our findings
are at odds with the existing literature: we do not find any significant link between diversity,
generalised trust and activity in organisations, which are commonly used measures of social
capital.
The added value of the article is to consider a wider variety of neighbourhood outcomes than
the existing literature, to pay closer attention to issues of causality and endogeneity through the
use of fixed effects, instrumental variables and sample selection, and to provide estimates on
the impact of diversity on infra-marginal residents, which may be the most important effects,
especially when residential mobility rates are low.
While people may care about the nature of their neighbours, they cannot control who they
are. My presence in an area may have some externalities on my neighbours, and my decision
to move is not something that they can control.51 This combination of caring about something
but being unable to control it is the classic recipe for stress, so it is not surprising that changing
communities stir up strong emotions and reactions. As Putnam (2007) noted, the rise in diversity
is probably here to stay and societies need to work out how to manage its consequences to make
communities thrive.
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